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1I.  Introduction
It has become an increasingly prevalent conviction, perhaps beginning with Rumelt
(1984), that sound theorizing about strategy should be founded in a theory of the
firm, and that economic theories of the firm hold certain attractions in this regard.
Indeed, within the last decade,  contractual theories of economic organization1 have
made a substantial impact in the field of strategic management and are now seen as
being among “the most influential theoretical perspectives in strategy research
(Zajac 1992: 76).2  As a result, many issues of strategic management are now
conceptualized as problems of efficient governance.  It would also seem to be a
reasonable conjecture that this impact is unlikely to diminish in importance in the
field for some time to come.
However, the influence of the contractual approach has not gone entirely
unchallenged.  In previous work, I have argued that in the current theoretical
landscape of  economic organization, two sets of theories constitute the dominant
theoretical contenders (Foss 1993, 1997a,c).  One is what has here generically been
called “contractual theories of economic organization”, while the other one may
equally generically be called “the capabilities view of the firm”.3  In a nutshell, the
former stream views the firm as arising because it efficiently solves incentive
conflicts that market organization is not capable of solving (equally efficiently); the
latter stream views the firm as existing because it more successfully than markets
coordinates and accumulates productive knowledge.
                                         
1  By “the modern economics of organization” or “organizational economics”, I here have in mind a
rather broad menu of theories, such as transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985), the
incomplete contract approach (Hart 1995),  principal/agent theory (Holmström 1982), and the nexus
of contracts approach (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
2  See the discussion in Mahoney and Pandian (1992) and Seth and Thomas (1994).
3   In this case, too,  a broad menu of theories is involved, including “the evolutionary theory of the
firm” (Nelson and Winter 1982), “the competence perspective (Foss 1993), “the capabilities
perspective” (Langlois and Robertson 1995), “the dynamic capabilities perspective” (Teece and
Pisano 1994),  and  “the resource-based approach” (Wernerfelt 1984).
2Both approaches to the theory of the firm have been presented by various
proponents as reaching for what Richard Rumelt (1984) in a classic paper called “a
strategic theory of the firm”.  By that term, I will here understand a theory of the
existence, organization, boundaries and competitive advantage of the firm.  However, it
will be argued that in searching for a strategic theory of the firm, we confront two
imperfect contenders.  To put it briefly, while the economics of organization is of
considerable relevance to the strategy field, and while it is characterized by
(relative) explanatory elegance and simplicity, it is also likely to misrepresent many
strategy issues.  On the other hand, while the capabilities perspective is much truer
to the traditional interests and concerns of the strategy field (because this is partly
where it was originally developed), it is at present much too dispersed and
explanatorily unclear to serve as a strategic theory of the firm.
The further argument is that that recent work on real options (Sanchez 1993;
Dixit and Pindyck 1994) show promise of helping us to advance the strategic theory
of the firm by
· Bringing a dynamic dimension to existing theories of the firm which they
lack at present.  While contractual approaches do not inquire into issues
such as learning and innovation, there is, as many writers have pointed out
(e.g., Porter 1994), a distinctively retrospective character to capabilities
arguments.  Arguably, an options perspective may help remedying these
deficiencies.
· Casting new light over the issues of the boundaries and possibly also the
existence of firms.  Thus, including an options perspective in the theory of
the firm is likely to alter traditional ideas on, for example, efficient
boundaries: those boundaries of the firm that would be the preferred ones
from a static transaction cost minimizing point of view may not be the right
ones in a longer run perspective where the creation of options becomes of
paramount importance.
3Thus, the argument of this paper does not amount to an extension of the theory of
real options per se.   Rather the argument, or, if you like, statement calling for
further research, is that there is a potential for cross-fertilization between theorizing
on real options and recent theorizing on the theory of the firm, of the capabilities
and the contractual variety.  Because of space limitations, many of the above points
are, unfortunately, communicated in a telegraphic manner, but hopefully the
references given may assist in cases where the reasoning is overly compact.
II. Modern Theories of the Firm:
Coordinating Incentives vs Coordinating Knowledge
A.  The Contractual View of the Firm:
Coordinating Incentives, Property Rights, and Commitments
The basic features of the emergence of the modern contractual theory of the are
well-known: As the story is normally told, the theory of the firm traces its existence
back to Coase’s landmark 1937 essay on “The Nature of the Firm”.  Coase pointed
out that in the world of neoclassical price theory, firms have no reason to exist.  The
reason why firms existed after all, Coase reasoned, must be that there is a “cost to
using the price mechanism” (Coase 1937: 390).  Thus was born the idea of
transaction costs: costs that stand separate from and in addition to ordinary
production costs.4  Much later, Coase (1972: 63) noted that his 1937 essay had been
“much cited and little used.”  However, it is somewhat ironic that precisely at the
                                         
4 In the 1937 article, he lists several sources of those “costs of using the price mechanism” that give
rise to the institution of the firm.  In part, these are the costs of writing contracts.  The “most
obvious cost of ‘organising’ production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the
relevant prices are” (Coase 1937: 390).  A second type of cost is that of executing separate contracts
for each of the multifold market transactions that would be necessary to coordinate some complex
production activity. Firm organization may avoid these costs, and exists for this reason. Including
also various costs of internal organization helps explaining, by means of standard marginal
reasoning, where the boundaries of the firm is located.
4time of Coase’s lamentation, serious work on economic organization that rested on
distinctly Coasean foundations had actually begun (i.e., Williamson 1971; Alchian
and Demsetz 1972).  And only a few years later, the theory of the firm field
virtually exploded.  All this work followed Coase in conceptualizing the firm as a
contractual entity whose existence, boundaries and internal organization could be
rendered intelligible in terms of economizing with transaction costs.
The present flagbearer of the field, Oliver Williamson has focused in on what
has become perhaps the central concept in the present-day economics of
organization: asset specificity. The logic is basically simple.  Assets are highly
specific when they have value within the context of a particular transaction but
have relatively little value outside the transaction.  This opens the door to
opportunism. Once the contract is signed and the assets deployed, one of the parties
may threaten to pull out of the arrangement — thereby reducing the value of the
specific assets — unless a greater share of the quasi-rents of joint production find
their way into the threat-maker’s pockets.   Fear of such “hold up” ex post will affect
investment choices ex ante.   In the absence of appropriate contractual safeguards,
the transacting parties may choose less specific — and therefore less specialized and
less productive — technology.   If, by contrast, the transacting parties were to pool
their capital into a single enterprise in whose profits they jointly shared, the
incentives for unproductive rent-seeking would be attenuated.
The explanation from asset specificity is at base an argument about the
alignment of incentives, even if it ultimately rests on imperfect information: in a
world of certainty and unrestricted cognitive ability (if one could imagine such a
place), it would be easy to write and enforce long-term contracts that preempt ex
ante unproductive rent-seeking behavior ex post and thus obviate internalization.
Indeed, whatever their differences may be, the central heuristic that characterizes
all contractual theories of the firm (see footnote 1) is an overriding emphasis on
conceptualizing literally all problems of economic organization as problems of
aligning incentives/efficient governance.
5It cannot be denied that in many respects, this research strategy has proven
immensely profitable in terms of  generating new important insights.  But, in the
view taken here, it should also be recognized that it misrepresents important
phenomena and hinder understanding other phenomena.  The problem is certainly
not that reformulations of traditional management and strategy issues in terms of
optimization and incentives are internally inconsistent.   Rather, the issue is
whether the mechanisms so identified are in fact plausible explanations of the
phenomena under study, and that to translate these assumptions into an exclusive and
near-universal research strategy arguably closes off a range of plausible alternative
explanations of what firms are and what strategic managers do. More
generally, one can point to a number of blind spots in the contractual theory of the
firm5, which are arguably caused by its narrow research heuristics:
· It is not recognized that knowledge about how to produce is imperfect (or,
if you prefer, dispersed, bounded, sticky and idiosyncratic), that is,
differential capabilities are not treated (Foss 1993).
· Relatedly, it is not recognized that knowledge about how to link together
one person’s (or firm’s) productive knowledge with that of another is also
imperfect (Richardson 1972; Langlois and Robertson 1995).
· Innovation (except organizational innovation) and organizational learning
are suppressed, since the contractual view pays no attention to processes
(and products per se (only to how these are organized) (Foss 1993).
· Competitive advantage can only be understood in terms of economizing
with transaction costs; not in terms of accumulation of scarce, rent-yielding
and flexibility and responsiveness to changing market circumstances
(Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997).
                                         
5  Blind, that is, in regard to the requirements that a full-blown strategic theory of the firm (in the
sense defined earlier) should meet.
6· The benefit aspects may be formally recognized through the stipulation that
efficient economic organization maximizes joint surplus, but in practice all
attention is concentrated on transaction costs, neglecting transaction benefits,
and missing, in effect, the Chandlerian (Chandler 1990) story of increasing
transaction costs in order to lower production costs.
B. The Capabilities View: Coordinating Knowledge
The view of the firm presented in contractual theories has recently been contested
by the capabilities view; a body of theorizing that is more conscious of the character
and limitations of knowledge than is the mainstream economics of organization.
The conceptualization of the firm that underlies this work was perhaps best
expressed in the late Edith Penrose’s The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959), one
that she explicitly differentiated from the prevailing production-function view.
“The firm,” Penrose says, “is ... a collection of productive resources the disposal of
which between different uses and over time is determined by administrative
decision” (Penrose 1959: 24).  Although this is often overlooked, her theory is one
that stresses entrepreneurship. In Penrose’s story, the management team holds images
of the external environment and of the firm’s internal resources (this is the subjectivist
part of her analysis).  She further argues that these images are produced through
internal learning processes, and that they determine the constantly changing
“productive opportunity set” of the firm, that is, the productive possibilities that that
the firm’s “’entrepreneurs’ see and can take advantage of” (Penrose 1959: 31). “In the
long run”, Penrose explains,
... the profitability, survival and growth of a firm does not depend so
much on the efficiency with which it is able to organize the production of
even a widely diversified range of products as it does on the ability of
the firm to establish one or more wide and relatively impregnable ‘bases’
from which it can adapt and extend its operations in an uncertain,
changing and competitive world (1959: 137).
7Thus, seemingly paradoxically, flexibility is just as much a message of the analysis
as specialization is.  The paradox vanishes when it is realized that specialization is
specialization in terms of the underlying resource-base (rather than products) and
that such specialization may be fully consistent with reacting to new business
opportunities.
Whereas Penrose explicitly begins from cognition,  modern contributions to the
capabilities perspectives simply begin from the empirical generalization that
productive knowledge is neither explicit nor freely transferable.  Either way it boils
down to the same common-sense recognition, namely that  individuals — and
organizations — are necessarily limited in what they know how to do well.  Indeed,
the main interest of the capabilities view is to understand what is distinctive about
firms as unitary, historical organizations of co-operating individuals and how this
may help explaining competitive advantage and economic organization. Typically,
the interest has here centered on the tacit and distributed character of much
production knowledge. Indeed, capabilities are precisely characterized by these
features: they may be seen as team-embodied and partly tacit production and
organization knowledge that can be operated by team-members for a strategic
purpose.  Moreover, these qualities may make valuable capabilities hard to imitate,
and thus underlie sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991).
In a world of tacit and distributed knowledge, firms typically do not confront
the same production costs for the same productive tasks.  Moreover, in such a
world, economic activity may be afflicted with what Richard Langlois has called
“dynamic transaction costs”, the costs that arise in real time in the process of
acquiring and coordinating productive knowledge (Langlois 1992; Langlois and
Robertson 1995) and which are different in nature from the transaction costs that
are caused by problems of aligning incentives.  This, in turn, suggests that the
capabilities perspective may be interpreted as an alternative theory of economic
organization.
8A possible starting point of the argument is that a firm may control production
knowledge that is, in important dimensions, strongly different (“dissimilar”) from what
others control.  And an implication may be that  members of one firm quite literally do
not understand what another firm wants from them (for example, in supplier contracts)
or is offering them (for example, in license contracts).  Because of the extreme specificity
and tacitness of much productive knowledge, one firm may have difficulties
understanding another firm’s capabilities; and both firms separately and together may
know more than their contracts can.   In this setting, the costs of making contacts with
potential partners, of educating potential licensees and franchisees, of teaching
suppliers what it is one needs from them, etc., become very real factors determining
where the boundaries of firms will be placed.  Thus. coordination problems may arise
because of “friction”: the knowledge, cognitive frames, and skills embodied in
existing governance structures (be they firms, markets, or in between) may be too
inflexible, especially in the face of major “Schumpeterian” change, to seize market
and technological opportunities (Chandler 1992).  In such circumstances, other
governance structures that can muster the necessary capabilities may arise and
prosper.
The upshot of this section is that the capabilities perspective indeed is a
distinct emerging perspective on economic organization, one that would appear to
be particularly well suited to explaining the boundaries of the firm in dynamic
environments.  It is characterized by highlighting explanatory mechanisms that are
different from those of modern economics of organization, not the least with respect
to the attempt to restore knowledge to is rightful place as a determinant of, not only
competitive advantage, but also economic organization.  However, in many
respects the capabilities perspective suffers from weaknesses:
· As many writers (including Porter 1994) have pointed out, there is a distinctively
retrospective character to the perspective; in other words, it is not (sufficiently)
predictive, and its applicability to practical decision-making is therefore
somewhat doubtful.
9· Relatedly, one is not being told very much about the accumulation of new,
valuable, hard-to-imitate resources, the emphasis clearly being placed on
evaluating existing resources (e.g., Barney 1991).
· As argued at length in Foss (1996b&c, 1997c), there are also deep problems with
the perspective in its manifestation as a theory of economic organization. For
example, it does not convincingly explain the existence of the firm, and it has
nothing to say about asset ownership.
C.  Summing Up
The argument so far can be summarized thus: in searching for a strategic theory of
the firm, we are confronting two imperfect contenders that are characterized by
explaining economic organization in widely different ways. I have discussed their
imperfections and explained why they both at their present state of development
are unlikely to serve as bases for a strategic theory of the firm. To put it briefly,
while the economics of organization is of considerable relevance to the strategy
field, it is also likely to misrepresent many strategy issues because of its static
nature and its neglect of knowledge.  On the other hand, while the capabilities
perspective arguably lies closer to the traditional interests and concerns of the
strategy field (because this is partly where it was originally developed), it is at
present too explanatorily unclear and has too much of a retrospective character to
serve as a strategic theory of the firm.  The contention that will be briefly elaborated
in the next section is that a real options perspective has the potential to help
remedying these defects.  With respect to the contractual perspective, an options
perspective leads us to ask questions relating to the economic organization of
options which leads into issues of innovation, corporate venturing and
organizational learning. And with respect to the capabilities perspective, an options
perspective has the potential to do away with an overly retrospective orientation,
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precisely because the options perspective directs our attention to future possibilities
of action.6
III.  Organizing Real Options
A. The Options Lens on Strategy
Originally developed in the context of finance theory (Myers 1977), and applied to
capital budgeting and issues relating to the allocation of resources for R&D
purposes, the real options perspective is increasingly making an impact in the
broader strategy field (Sanchez 1993; Cowman and Hurry 1993).  The reason is
rather obvious: as the change in technologies, preferences, regulations, etc. seems to
have substantially, so has calls for increased flexibility in increasingly dynamic
markets. Firms have been urged to develop those “dynamic capabilities” (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen 1997) that will help them achieve this flexibility.
However, flexibility has been notoriously hard to conceptualize; what
precisely should be flexible, to which extent should flexibility obtain, etc.  As Ron
Sanchez (1993) points out, a primary attraction  of a real options perspective is
precisely that it provides some formal discipline to loose notions of flexibility in the
context of the firm strategy field.   Thus, an options perspective indicates, for
example, that optimal flexibility is not maximum flexibility, since the costs of
acquiring “maximum” flexibility are unlimited.  Optimal flexibility corresponds to
the plan of action that enables the firm to acquire the set of options that maximizes
the net present value of the firm.  This has direct strategic relevance, for strategy
may be seen through the options lens (Bowman and Hurry 1993) as a process of
organizational resource-investment choices or options.
                                         
6  This argument can also be found in Sanchez (1993).
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Thus, in a useful discussion, Sanchez (1993) points out that to the extent that
we wish to conceptualize strategic flexibility through the options lens, we may do
so by thinking of firms as being flexible in terms of, for example, which products they
wish to produce, when they will produce (and develop and market) these products,
and how the production (and sale and marketing and development) of the products
should be organized.  Because an option is a right to choose whether or not to take an
action now or at some future time, this means that we can speak, referring to these
three sets of choices, of product options, timing options, and implementation
options.  This has rather direct links to some aspects of the preceding discussion.
For example, what Penrose (1959) calls the firm’s “productive opportunity set” -
which encompasses all of the opportunities that the firm’s management can see and
can (but doesn’t have to) take advantage of - clearly constitutes a set of real product
options.  In principle, these real options can be valued, using the same tools that
have been developed in the context of financial options.
The contention here is that the options perspective not only has implications
for firm strategy, but also for the theory of economic organization.  For example, an
options view on economic organization  better helps us, I suggest, to recognize the
benefit aspects of firms, hybrids and markets, something that may sometimes have
been neglected in some quarters of the contractual approach to firm, because of its
near exclusive concern with transaction costs.
B. Institutions as Reserves
A good starting point for developing these implications is to pick up on an idea
developed by the economist Brian Loasby (1976, 1994a&b) and conceptualize
institutions in general as substitutes for contingent claims markets, more
specifically, as reserves.   The thrust of Loasby’s argument is that when there is not a
complete set of contingent forward markets - not just because transaction costs
close these, but more fundamentally because there cannot be markets for goods and
services that haven’t even been imagined yet - there is a need for flexibility-
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providing institutions, for reserves in short.  “Both firms and markets”, Loasby
says, “... are devices for creating and preserving the possibility of future
transactions; they are intangible and complex capital assets which are valuable
precisely because the future is not predictable enough to justify present
commitments” (1994: 8).  For example, the institutional structure of an organized
market is a set of sunk-cost investments (Casson 1982) that implies the commitment
of the involved parties to sustain a possibility for future transacting, and therefore
provides a set of options to buy and options to sell.  But, as Loasby points out, we
may view the firm in exactly the same terms:
The firm is a response to structural uncertainty.  If there are no adequate
markets for contingent commodities because no-one knows how to specify
the appropriate contingency sets, then the remedy is to create option sets
in the firm of reserves (1994: 252-253).
In this view of institutions-as-reserves, what would primarily seem to distinguish
firms and markets is that whereas ongoing markets are undesigned institutions that
embody options for future contracts, ongoing firms are designed institutions that
embody contracts for future options, as it were.
C. Firms as Options-Providing Institutions
One possible import of Loasby’s reasoning is that we may conceptualize firms as
governance structures whose primary rationale lies in their  provision of options.  It
is perhaps not so very surprising so find an embryonic options-perspective on the
firm in the work of Penrose. “A firm”, she explains, “... is basically a collection of
resources.  Consequently, if we can assume that businessmen believe there is more
to know about the resources they are working with than they do know at any given
time, and that more knowledge would be likely to improve the efficiency and
profitability of their firm, then unknown and unused productive services
immediately become of considerable importance, not only because the belief that
they exist acts as an incentive to acquire new knowledge, but also because they
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shape the scope and direction of the search for knowledge” (Penrose 1959: 77).   We
can also distill ideas about options from the broader literature on firm capabilities
(although few (none?) contributors have done so explicitly), for a capability may be
interpreted as a capacity to act in certain ways in a certain range of circumstances.
Thus, the idea of real options is arguably inherent in the idea of capability, but
needs to be unfolded, for example, in the direction of a theory of building new
capabilities through the creation of options (see Sanchez 1993).
It is certainly more surprising to find ideas that stress flexibility as a part of
the rationales of firms and points towards an options-perspective in the work of the
founder of the contractual approach to the firm, Ronald Coase (1937).  In a
discussion of long-term, incomplete contracts, Coase points out that
... owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period for the
contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible,
and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify
what the other contracting party is expected to do. It may well be a matter
of indifference to the person supplying the service or commodity which of
several courses of action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service
or commodity.  But the purchaser will not know which of these several
courses he will want the supplier to take. Therefore, the service which is
being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact details being left
until a later date. When the direction of resources ... becomes dependent
on the supplier in this way, that relationship which I term “the firm” may
be obtained (Coase 1937; my emphasis).
This is as clear an association between the existence of the firm and the provision of
flexibility - the wish to maintain and/or create a portfolio of real options - that one
could wish for.
The economic logic is not spelled out in Coase’s article, but it could proceed
along several lines.  For example, firms may be the preferred governance structure
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for the creation of real options for reasons of appropriability in cases where the
relevant real option are in the nature of new technological knowledge.  Or one may
point to the coordination gains7 that firms may obtain relative to markets in cases
where the process of creating options requires the coordination of organizational
learning processes (Conner and Prahalad 1996).  Because firms come equipped with
incomplete contracts8, and a supporting infra-structure of corporate cultures and
management heuristics, they may under certain circumstances be the proper
framework around the process of providing new options and realizing these; with
Loasby (1994), they may indeed “provide contracts for future options”.
In general, firms cannot exist under competitive discipline unless they earn
returns on their projects that are at least enough greater than the market value of
their assets to offset the unavoidable costs (Williamson 1985; Grossman and Hart
1986) of hierarchical organization (Robins 1992) - excess returns that are normally
being ascribed to the presence of various hard-to-trade, specialized, organizational
assets, such as team skills, culture, and the like (Alchian and Demsetz 1972;
Langlois and Robertson 1995; Conner and Prahalad 1996).   The suggestion here is
that the ability to generate options that cannot (equally efficiently) be generated by
“the market” - what may arguably be identical to the “dynamic capabilities” of
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) - is one further “X-asset” (Robins 1992) whose helps
explaining the existence of the firm.
Whereas this reasoning is not in principle opposed to the contractual theory of
the firm9, there is a considerable change of emphasis.  For instead of
conceptualizing the firm as an institution that exists because it hinders something,
                                         
7  Firms can often save on communication costs relative to markets. See Foss (1997c) for an
elaboration of this argument.
8  Which allow for the production of new partly unanticipated learning (Loasby 1976; Foss 1996a;
Conner and Prahalad 1996).
9 Since X-assets may be specific assets in Williamson’s (1985) sense and thus need the protection that
unified ownership may offer.
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such as opportunistic behavior, it is rather seen as existing because it promotes
something, namely the production of new options.  In an real options/flexibility
perspective, optimal economic organization/the efficient boundaries of the firm
maximizes the options value of the firm.  This is considerably broader (but may
incorporate) the idea that optimal economic organization minimizes transaction
costs (Williamson 1985) or minimizes the costs of acquiring and utilizing
knowledge (Casson 1997).
From an options perspective, firms may cease to be the proper frameworks
for organizing options - for path-dependencies, organizational rigidities of all
kinds, framing effects, and much else may stifle the process of creating and
realizing options.   In that case, the firms may dissolve, or, if it continues to exist,
will exist because of other, more standard, reasons such as its superior ability to
resolve incentive conflicts. Moreover, for some types of learning -  for example,
learning within a modular system - markets may sometimes be superior to firms
(see the analysis in Langlois and Robertson 1995).  As this suggests, viewing
economic organization through the options lens must really be a comparative
exercise, since markets and hybrid structures, such as joint-ventures, alliances and
networks, may also function as options-providing institutions.  For example, joint-
ventures are not just means to pool complementary, but dissimilar assets
(Richardson 1972) or efficient governance structures in situations of medium asset-
specificity  (Williamson 1996); they may also be created as real options to expand in
response to future technological and market developments, the exercise of the
option taking place by the acquisition of the venture (Kogut 1988).   Other types of
inter-firm realizations may play similar roles.  An obvious question therefore is
what light an options perspective cast over the issue of the boundaries of the firm.
D. The Boundaries of the Firm
Again we may refer to the work of Loasby; not just his point that we should look
upon ongoing (and well-developed) markets as embodying options for future
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contracts, but just as much the point that “Firms and markets are clearly partial
substitutes; but it is no less important to recognize that they are also complements”
(Loasby 1994a, p.8).  Translated into the terminology used here, an ongoing, well-
developed market complement firm organization by providing options to wait and
options to abandon to firms: they allow firms to defer the acquisition of inputs and
make it contingent on an actual, future need, and they allow firms to get rid of
unconsumed inputs (Sanchez 1993: 272).  The capability to use markets intelligently
in this way may be an important source of competitive success, as the work of
Casson (1997) indicates, and as the cases of NIKE and IKEA confirm.
Likewise, participating in networks and other sorts of interfirm arrangements
may increase the number of real options available to firms, for example, by
providing better access to other firms’ capabilities (thus allowing the firm to extend
its technological capabilities and generate more product options), to “thin” input
markets, and to “the collective capabilities of the participants” in a network (Loasby
1994b: 263).  In other words, networks may provide options (of both the timing and
the product diversity) that are not easily obtained in more “normal” markets. “The
consequence” of such networks, says Loasby (ibid.), “is a pool of resources,
constituting a greater variety of reserves than can be accommodated within the
necessary constraints of a single firm”.
The other side of the coin thus is that internalization forfeits the option to wait
to acquire inputs; it cuts off the firm from a contingent deferral of the commitment
to incur the cost of inputs.  From this perspective, firms should internalize only a
few inputs that 1) are exceptionally difficult to obtain through markets or networks
and 2) are capable of generating superior options values for the firm.  Capabilities,
particularly of the “dynamic capabilities” variety, would often seem to have
precisely these characteristics.  Whereas proponents of the capabilities perspective
have often stressed point 1), they have more seldom stressed point 2), arguably
because of the somewhat retrospective orientation of that perspective.  Clearly, an
options perspective casts a dynamic light over the boundaries of the firm, since
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these do not just depend on current transaction cost problems (Williamson 1985) or
problems of coordinating capabilities (Richardson 1972; Langlois and Robertson
1995).
From the perspective of the firm, the efficient proportion between market and
hierarchy depends, not only on current transaction costs and capabilities, but more
fundamentally on “a vision of possible futures” (Loasby 1994: 253), including a
vision of which products the firm can produce in the future, which inputs are
necessary for producing these products, and an estimate of whether input markets
can be expected to be well-behaved or not (Sanchez 1993: 276).   The boundaries of
the firm determined by this vision may very well (in non-static environments) be
different from those boundaries that period-by-period minimizing of transaction
costs would imply.   For example, firms may refrain from outsourcing certain
activities, whose outsourcing conventional transaction cost reasoning would have
dictated, because the firm expects to achieve superior option value from these
activities.
IV. Conclusion
The contribution of this paper has been to review existing, predominantly
economic, theories of the firm, to point out that for the purposes of developing
strategic theory, these theories are lacking in several respects, and to finally suggest
that a real options perspective has the potential of furthering existing theories of the
firm in more dynamic directions.  Thus, it has been suggested that the options
perspective may supply a much-needed theory of building capabilities.   And it has
been argued that a consistent options perspective is likely to change some central
ideas of the contractual perspective, notably ideas on the existence and boundaries
of the firm.  While the notion that from an options perspective, efficient economic
organization maximizes joint value is not necessarily inconsistent with either
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capabilities or contractual theories of the firm, it does help us extend these
perspectives in a more dynamic direction.  For example, in the context of the issue
of the boundaries of the firm, an options perspective helps us understand how these
are not just determined by current transaction costs but may depend critically upon
expectations to products, technologies and organization.  By highlighting these
dynamic factors, an options perspective also helps bringing existing theories of the
firm into closer contact with such fields as technological innovation or
organizational learning which are essentially about important aspects of the process
of the creation of real options.   Thus, an options perspective is likely to ease the
construction of a strategic theory of the firm.
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